We present a complete characterization of the classical transfer problem for an exchange economy with an arbitrary finite number of traders. Our method is geometric, using an equilibrium manifold developed by Debreu, Mas-Colell, and Balasko. We show that for a regular equilibrium the transfer problem arises if and only if the index at the equilibrium is −1. This implies that the transfer problem does not happen if the equilibrium is Walras tatonnement stable. Our result generalizes Balasko's analogous result for an exchange economy with two traders.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the following classical transfer problem (Samuelson, 1952 (Samuelson, , 1954 : Problem 1.1. Suppose that in the world there are n countries trading l goods where n and l are arbitrary natural numbers. Then 
does it happen that after a country, say country A, gives away some of her endowment to other countries, country A's utility level goes up? If it happens, characterize it.
Samuelson considered an exchange economy with n = 2 and l = 2 (with or without various trade impediments). He also hinted that (without proof) the transfer problem is closely related to the economic stability. Balasko verified that Samuelson's intuition was correct. He showed that in a smooth exchange economy (without any trade impediments) the tranfer problem arises at a regular equilibrium if and only if the index at the equilibrium is −1, in other words, this pathology happens only when the equilibrium is locally Walras tatonnement unstable. Using the theory of equilibrium manifold, Balasko initially showed this for n = 2 and l = 2 (Balasko, 1978) , then for n = 2 and an arbitrary finite number l (Balasko, 2014) .
The main purpose of this paper is to extend Balasko's result for arbitrary finite numbers n and l. Roughly speaking, we show that
Theorem 1.2. For a smooth exchange economy with arbitrary finite numbers of traders (countries) and goods (without any trade impediments), the transfer problem arises at a regular equilibrium if and only if the index at the equilibrium is −1. In particular, the transfer problem arises only when the regular equilibrium is locally Walras tatonnement unstable.
For the precise formulation of the transfer problem, see Definition 3.2. Our model suits better than Balasko's model to the current world economy where many countries (insted of just 2 countries) trade large amount of goods. We do not consider any trade impediments. This simplifies our model, and also this is a reasonable assumption considering that various trade impediments have become negligible in the modern global world economy. Some might disagree with us: we leave the issue about trade costs for a future work.
Our approach is (differential) geometric: we use the theory of equilibrium manifold in (Debreu, 1970) , (Mas-Colell, 1985) , (Balasko, 2009 (Balasko, , 2011 . We restrict our equilibrium analysis to the set of regular equilibria. This is not a strong assumption: the set of regular equilibria is an open subset with the full measure in an equilibrium manifold (Balasko, 2011, Prop. 8.10) .
We kept the mathematical requirement minimum. Readers just need to know basic differential geometry (or differential topology), say, Milnor's little book (Milnor, 1965) or GuilleminPollack's classic (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974 ) is more than enough. (Actually just knowing the definition of a differentiable manifold and the statement of the transversality theorem suffices.) All necessary backgrounds on equilibrium manifolds, economic stability, and the index theorem are contained in the paper. Our references for general equilibrium theory and equilibrium manifolds are (Balasko, 2009 , 2011 ) and (Mas-Colell, 1985 .
Here is the structure of the paper. In Section 2, we set out notation and explain our economic model. Then in Section 3, we review the theory of equilibrium manifold and formulate the transfer problem in a precise way. In Section 4, we quickly review the relationship between economic stability and the index theorem. In Section 5, we thoroughly analyse our model and prove a key result Proposition 5.1. Then in Section 6, we apply all results from previous sections to prove the main result Theorem 6.1. Finally in Section 7, we state several open problems.
An exchange economy
We denote by N, R, and R >0 the set of natural numbers, the set of real numbers, and the set of positive real numbers respectively. Fix l ∈ N. We set the commodity space X := R l >0 (the strictly positive orthant of R l ). We set the l-th goods as a a numeraire: if p = (p 1 , · · · , p l ) ∈ X is a price vector, then p l = 1. We assume that all prices are strictly positive. The set of price vectors is S := R l−1 >0 × {1}. We have n ∈ N traders (countries). Each trader i ∈ {1, · · · , n} is endowed with a goods vector ω i ∈ X. We assume that our economy is an exchange economy with no production: the total resources r = n i=1 ω i of the economy is fixed. We write
for the space of endowment of the economy. We assume that each trader's preferences is represented by a smooth utility function u i : X → R. For z i ∈ X, we write I zi := {y i ∈ X | u i (y i ) = u i (z i )} (the indifference surface for trader i going through the point z i ). We assume that each u i satisfies the following standard hypotheses for the differential equilibrium analysis (Mas-Colell, 1985) , (Balasko, 2009) . For any x i ∈ X, (i) smooth monotonicity:
Given a price vector p ∈ S and an budget w i = p · ω i ∈ R >0 , each trader maximizes the utility u i (x i ) under the budget constraint p · x i ≤ w i . Then there exists a unique solution to this utility maximization problem, and we obtain a smooth demand function f i : S × R >0 → X satisfying Walras's law: p · f i (p, w i ) = w i . Note: Do not confuse w i with ω i . We are following Debreu's (and Balasko's) notation (Debreu, 1970) , (Balasko, 2014) .
The equilibrium manifold
Note that the equilibrium manifold E is a real smooth manifold in the usual sense in differential geometry (Milnor, 1965) , (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974) . See (Balasko, 2009, Prop. 2.4 .1) for a proof.
For (p, ω) ∈ S × X, we denote by z −l (p, ω) ∈ R l−1 the vector defined by the first l − 1 components of z(p, ω). Since each trader satisfies Walras' law at an equilibrium, we have
We write p −l for the vector defined by the first l-coordinates of p. (The l-th coordinate is fixed by the numeraire assumption anyway.) Recall that an equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is regular if the Jacobian matrix J(p, ω) := Dz −l (p, ω)/Dp −l is invertible (Mas-Colell, 1985) (Balasko, 2009) .
Suppose that (p, ω) ∈ E is a regular equilibrium. Then by applying the implicit function theorem to the equation z −l (p, ω) = 0, we can express p in terms of ω. Then by (Balasko, 2011, Prop. 7 .2), there exist a neighborhood U of ω, a neighborhood V of (p, ω), and a smooth map s : U → S such that the map σ : U → V defined by σ(x) = (s(x), x) is a diffeomorphism between U and V . Following (Balasko, 2014) , we call σ (or s) the local equilibrium selection map (the local equilibrium price selection map) associated with (p, ω). Now we are ready to state the transfer problem in a precise way: Definition 3.2. We say that there is a transfer problem at a regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E if there exists an endowment vector ω ′ ∈ U and a trader i ∈ {1, · · · , n} such that
where s : U → S is the local equilibrium price selection map associated with (p, ω) defined above.
Note that the definition of the transfer problem at (p, ω) ∈ E requires (p, ω) to be regular (since otherwise we do not have the function s). However this is not a strong restriction: the set of regular equilibria in E is open with the full measure of E; see (Balasko, 2011, Prop. 8.10 ).
Economic stability and the index theorem
In this short section, we review the definition of the index at an equilibrium (p, ω) and its relationship with economic stability to make this paper self-contained. Our references here are (Arrow and Hahn, 1971) , (Hirsch et al., 2004) , and (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974) . Recall that the index of a regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is 1 (or −1) if the sign of (−1) l−1 det(J(p, ω)) is positive (or negative respectively). It is well-known that if (p, ω) ∈ E is a Walras tatonnement locally stable equilibrium, then all eigenvalues of J(p, ω) must have strictly negative real parts. Thus the index of such (p, ω) ∈ E must be 1. Note that the converse fails: there exists an equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E such that the index of (p, ω) is 1 but (p, ω) is not Walras tatonnement locally stable. See the references above for more on this.
A geometric approach to equilibrium analysis
In this section, we follow the argument in (Balasko, 2014, Sec. 3) closely. Define the priceincome space H(r) associated with the fixed social endowment r by H(r) : (w 1 , · · · , w n ) . From the definition, it is clear that H(r) is an (l + n − 2)-dimensional hyperplane in S × R n >0 . We set the coordinates for H(r) by
. Note that we omitted the last coordinate of w since w n is determined by
We call B(r) the section manifold. This is a smooth (n − 1)-dimensional submanifold of H(r) by (Balasko, 2009, Prop. 5.4.1) . In the following, we give a concrete parametrization of B(r) that comes handy for our geometric equilibrium analysis.
Let P (r) be the set of Pareto optimal allocations. First, we parametrize P (r). Let U (r) be the set of vectors (u 1 , · · · , u n−1 ) = u −n ∈ R n−1 of the first n − 1 traders' feasible utility levels, that is
Given u −n ∈ U (r) we obtain a Pareto optimal allocation x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) ∈ X n by solving the following constrained optimization problem:
We write x(u −n ) = (x 1 (u −n ), · · · , x n (u −n )) for the solution of this optimization problem. Under our assumptions on smooth preferences, there exists a unique price vector p(u −n ) ∈ S that supports x(u −n ). Note that p(u −n ) is parallel to the gradiant vectors Du i (x i (u −n )). We can express all Pareto optimal allocations as x(u −n ) by varying u −n in U (r).
Here is a crucial observation: the point
r) belongs to B(r) for any u −n ∈ U (r). Conversely, any point (p, w) ∈ B(r) is associated with a unique point u −n ∈ U (r) via u −n = (u 1 (f 1 (p, w 1 ), · · · , u n−1 (f n−1 (p, w n−1 ))). Thus, u −n ∈ U (r) parametrizes the section manifold B(r) as well as the set of Pareto optimal allocations P (r).
For the map M : U (r) → B(r), we write ∂M ∂ui for the partial derivative of M with respect to u i for i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}. We set a positive orientation for B(r) via ( For ω ∈ Ω, we define the budget space A(ω) associated with the endowment ω by
is a linear space being the intersection of hyperplanes defined by w i = p · ω i in the hyperplane H(r).
It is easy to see that (p, ω) ∈ S × Ω is an equilibrium if and only if (p,
r). The point is that we split the equilibrium analysis into the analysis of two separate parts A(ω) and B(r). The first part A(ω) is a linear space. Thus all nonlinearities of the equilibrium equation z(p, ω) = 0 is captured by B(r). Note that B(r) does not depend on ω: all ω-terms are in A(ω).
Using the coordinate system (p −l , w −n ) for H(r) and the equations w i = p · ω i , we see that A(ω) is parallel to the (l − 1)-dimensional vector space whose basis {a 1 (ω), · · · , a l−1 (ω)} (in terms of this coordinate system) is given by
We set the positive orientation of A(ω) via (a 1 (ω), · · · , a l−1 (ω)). Clearly the set of vectors a i (ω) is linearly independent, so the dimension of A(ω) is l − 1.
Pick a regular equilibrium (p,
. By the celebrated transversality theorem (Mas-Colell, 1985 , Chap.1.I), this is equivalent to
Here is the main result of this section.
is positive (or negative respectively).
Proof. Although we could prove the proposition by a (not illuminating) tedious direct computation, we avoid it by utilizing the parametrization of B(r) via U (r) above. The following argument shows that ∆(p, ω) has the opposite sign of J(p, ω) for any regular (p, ω) ∈ E, which is sufficient for our purpose.
) is a no-trade equilibrium. By (Balasko, 2011, Prop. 8 .2) every no-trade equilibrium is regular, so (p(u −n ), ω(u −n )) is regular.
Note that A(ω(u −n )) varies continuously as u −n moves around in U (r). Thus the function δ : U (r) → R defined by δ(u −n ) := ∆(p(u −n ), ω(u −n )) is continuous. We see that δ never take the value 0 for any u −n ∈ U (r) since every no-trade equilibrium is regular. So it is enough to check the sign of δ for any particular value of u −n since U (r) is connected. (We are using the same argument as in the proof of (Balasko, 2014, Lem. 1) 
where e i is the column vector whose i-th coordinate is 1 and all other coordinates are zero. Let ∆ ′ (p(u −n (ω)), ω) be the submatix of ∆ (p(u −n (ω)), ω) formed by the last (n − 1) rows and columns of ∆ (p(u −n (ω)), ω). Then
Note that the vector ∂M ∂ui (u −n (ω)) for i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1} is the direction of increasing trader i's utility level holding other trader's utility level fixed at u j (0) for all j ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}\{i}.
Since the income of all traders i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1} is 0 at (p(u −n (ω)), ω), we must have
where x is the i-th component and x ∈ R >0 .
Therefore we clearly have det (∆ ′ (p(u −n (ω)), ω)) > 0, and we are done.
Remark 5.2. We have shown that the index at (p, ω) ∈ E is same as the intersection number of A(ω) and B(r) at the corresponding point (p, p·ω 1 , · · · , p·ω n ) ∈ H(r); see (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974, p.96) for the definition of the intersection number of two smooth manifolds.
The transfer problem
Let i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}. Let ω, ω ′ ∈ Ω. Following (Balasko, 2014, Sec. 4) , we say that the hyperplane A(ω) lies below the hyperplane A(ω
; see (Balasko, 2014, Lem. 2) for a proof. Now, we interpret the local equilibrium price selection map in Definition 3.2 using A(ω) and 
Since B(r) is a smooth connected manifold and parametrized by u −n ∈ U (r), there exist curves C 1 (and C 2 ) from t(ω) to b(p, ω) (and from b(p, ω) to t(ω) respectively) where points on C 1 (those on C 2 ) correspond to the utility level of trader 1 lower than or equal to u 1 (p, ω) (higher than or equal to u 1 (p, ω) respectively).
If the intersection number of A(ω) and
Let U ′ be an open neighborhood of ω where the local equilibrium price selection map s : U ′ → P is defined. Without loss, we choose U ′ such that the image of the projection of U onto Ω is contained in U . Then if ω ′ ∈ U ′ and ω Note: although the proof shows there exists the transfer problem which improve trader 1's utility level after he/she gives away some of his/her endowment, there is nothing special for trader 1. A similar argument works for any trader i.
Remark 6.2. Suppose that we are at a no-trade equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E. In (Balasko, 2011) , Balasko showed that the set of regular equilibria is partitioned into a finite number of pathconnected components and the index is constant in each component. Moreover he showed that the set of no-trade equilibria is contained in the unique component of index 1. Therefore the transfer problem arises only for a large amount of trades. (Samuelson, 1954) .
Open questions

